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ABSTRACT
Online users use more and more social login on third-party sites 
or applications. To use an existing account to login is faster than 
to fill in personal information forms over and over again. 
However, many online users, even those who frequently use social 
login systems, are not aware of the policies and conditions they 
agree with. They are often unaware of the consequences of their 
authentications to access websites and applications, and thus of 
the information that can be retrieved from their social networks.  
In this paper, we provide a case-study of the legal requirements 
that must be observed when social login features are used for 
authentication in a mobile application in the workplace. The legal 
requirements considered in this case-study follow from the 
Belgian implementation of the EU legal framework on privacy 
and data protection. Particularly interesting for this study is the 
storage of the data following from external social network 
profiles; the retention of the retrieved information processed to 
compute an extra layer of reputation; and the policies 
accompanying the social login features. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy Issues – Privacy, 
Regulation. K.4.3 [Computers and Society]: Social Issues – 
Employment. K.6.5 [Management of Computing and 
Information Systems]: Security and Protection – Authentication.  
General Terms
Security, Human Factors, Legal Aspects. 
Keywords
Social Login, Online Reputation, Workplace Privacy, Legal 
Aspects. 
1. INTRODUCTION
More and more sites and applications allow their users to create 
an account and authenticate for further logins via a third-party 
social network such as LinkedIn, Google, Facebook or Twitter. 
Users tend to prefer such social login because they do not have to 
fill in again their personal information every time they request 
access. Once they are logged in to a social network, they can 
easily use this login to access the other site or application. Thus 
this way of registration is faster for the user, and also more 
convenient because they do not need to remember other 
passwords than the one they use for their social network. 
However, users often do not take the time to carefully read the 
policy explanations before they authorize websites and 
applications to use their social networks for login. As a result they 
may not be aware of which information the websites and 
applications can retrieve from their social networks. 
In this paper, we provide a case-study of the legal requirements 
that must be observed when social login features are used for user 
authentication to access a mobile application, which retrieves 
information from social networks to compute an extra layer of 
reputation on top of that retrieved information, and which is 
owned or controlled by the user’s employer or contracting party. 
The considered legal requirements are based on the EU legal 
framework on privacy and data protection, as implemented in 
Belgian law. In Section 2 we discuss related work in the fields of 
social login and reputation computation. In Section 3 we present 
the studied mobile application. Section 4 lists our findings 
regarding the legal requirements for social login and further 
reputation computation according to Belgian law. And finally, in 
Section 5 we conclude and discuss future work. 
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we start by related work regarding the technical 
aspects of social login and reputation computation and then delve 
into related work regarding legal requirements. 
2.1 Social Login 
For the past 10 years, many technical initiatives have been 
launched in order to achieve single-sign-on (SSO) and federated 
identity management between different services, applications and 
Web sites owned by different legal entities. A few of these 
technical initiatives were strongly backed up by major information 
technology companies such as Windows Cardspace, Liberty 
Alliance or IBM Higgins [1]. Surprisingly, it is not them that 
achieved large scale user adoption but a combination of the 
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creation of open authentication and authorization protocols and 
their use by large scale online social networks such as Facebook. 
Users had already massively joined these online social networks 
and filled their information including with whom they are friends 
or connected. To avoid having to spend time re-authenticating, 
filling their information, and to remember new passwords, they 
then adopted massively the Facebook Connect social login option 
that many services, Web sites and application started to easily 
implement thanks to an Application Programming Interface (API) 
provided by Facebook. Given the success of Facebook Connect, 
other major online social networks started to provide their social 
login option and API such as Twitter or LinkedIn. Although most 
of them have built their social login according to the OAuth [2] 
open standard for authentication and authorization, the original 
open standard for authentication, which OAuth took a number of 
ideas from, is OpenID [3]. Unfortunately, although most of them 
have used a common standard basis and provide an API, their 
APIs are constantly evolving, often without backward 
compatibility with the previous version of their API, and are very 
different between the social networks. Thus, it has become 
difficult for a third-party service to cover all the potential social 
networks that a new potential user may want to use to create their 
account. This is why a new type of providers has emerged on top 
of these “social login” providers. Those providers do the hard 
work to maintain a tool that allows a user to create an account 
with all the “social login” providers as well as store and manage 
users information on behalf of the service or Web site that uses 
this tool. Thus, user management has started to be used for such 
services to clearly underline they go beyond previous identity 
management solutions that focused on the authentication and 
identity certification issues. The owners of Web sites and services 
install the user management tool on their Web site or service in 
order not to have to worry about maintaining code when one of 
the “social login” providers change their API. The price of 
allowing a user to create an account with any of the main online 
social networks providers without having to maintain each “social 
login” module has to be weighed against the subscription price to 
one of these user management providers such as Janrain [4] or 
Gigya [5]. As the number of intermediaries managing users 
information increase, some privacy concerns arise, especially 
when the users do not take the time or are not enough technology 
aware to check the information they allow to be shared between 
the intermediaries. It is the reason we tackle the legal aspects 
further in this paper.  
2.2 Reputation Computation 
The mobile application of our case-study, detailed in Section 3, 
uses the information extracted from the social login of the users in 
order to compute their reputation regarding different skills such as 
computer security technology awareness. A computational model 
of trust based on social research was first proposed by Marsh [6]. 
The EU-funded SECURE project [7] created a computational 
trust engine that uses evidence to compute trust values in entities 
and corresponds to evidence-based trust management systems. 
Evidence encompasses outcome observations, recommendations 
and reputation. A trust metric consists of the different 
computations and communications which are carried out by the 
trustor (and his/her network) to compute a trust value in the 
trustee. When recommendations are used, a social network can be 
reconstructed. Golbeck and Hendler [8] studied the problem of 
propagating trust value in social networks, by proposing an 
extension of the Friend-Of-A-Friend (FOAF) vocabulary and 
algorithms to propagate trust values estimated by users rather than 
computed based on a clear count of pieces of evidence. 
Reputation has been defined as follows : “Reputation is the 
subjective aggregated value, as perceived by the requester, of the 
assessments by other people, who are not exactly identified, of 
some quality, character, characteristic or ability of a specific 
entity without taking into account direct previous interactions 
with the entity” (adapted from [9]). However, to be able to 
perceive the reputation of an entity is only one aspect of 
reputation management. The other aspects of reputation 
management for an entity consist of: 
? Monitoring the entity reputation as broadly as possible 
in a proactive way; 
? Analysing the sources spreading the entity reputation; 
? Influencing the number and content of these sources to 
spread an improved reputation.    
Founded in 1995, eBay is the first large-scale online reputation 
service that allows the users to check the reputation of other 
buyers/sellers users or selling companies based on the number of 
positive and negative ratings that are aggregated in their Feedback 
Score as well as potential written text comments. Founded in 
2004, Opinity [9] was one of the first commercial effort to build 
decentralized online reputation for users in all contexts beyond 
eBay's limited e-commerce context. Unfortunately, Opinity closed 
as several other services that tried to become the leader in online 
reputation calculation because very few users are willing to pay 
for such service. However, a few new services try to compute the 
influence of users in such or such topic, which is related to the 
reputation of these users regarding a topic. For example, Klout 
[10] was created in 2008. Once the Klout account is linked to a 
user’s social network via social login, it can detect automatically 
when the user sends a new post and check how much buzz it has 
generated. Thus instead of computing the reputation of a person 
mainly based on recommendations from other users, Klout 
analyses the social networks of the user, e.g., Twitter based on the 
following 3 main criterions: 
? True Reach: the number of followers of the user’s 
Twitter account and following the user’s tweets 
? Amplification: the number of people who share a post 
(who distribute it to other users) 
? Network: the influence of the users composing the True 
Reach themselves 
Klout may integrate other evidence such as posts on other social 
networks (such as Facebook) or other users who recommend the 
user by adding a +K to the user on specific topics, meaning that 
they click on a link provided by Klout saying that the user has 
influenced them regarding that topic. Unfortunately most of those 
influence/reputation metrics are not open, i.e., it is not really clear 
how the results have been computed and based on which 
evidence. 
2.3 Legal Requirements 
Social login features allow sites and applications to process large 
amounts of personal data. The use of those features thus has a 
legal impact on the privacy and data protection rights of the users. 
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In the mobile application in our studied case, as is described in 
Section 3.1, the user might be a contractor or an employee to the 
company. For both types of users, the information retrieved from 
social networks is discussed according to the legal requirements 
resulting from the European Union Data Protection Directive. 
With regard to the general application of European data protection 
law and its implementation in the Belgian national law, De Bot 
[11], Kuner [12] and many others defined, analyzed and 
categorized the rights and principles of data protection 
extensively. More specifically with regard to the retrieval of 
personal data from social network profiles Valcke et al. [13] 
recently published an interesting book. In this book Graux [14] 
observes some challenges about the use of applications to retrieve 
user information. Though, his observations are more focused on 
user-protection in marketing and advertising matters. Our studied 
mobile application differs from this situation since it envisages to 
enhance company security, rather than profit making. Regarding 
workplace privacy, Hendrickx examined the use of social media in 
a Belgian employment context [15]. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no academic legal research undertaken on the 
specific subject of this paper. 
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDIED
MOBILE APPLICATION 
In this section we first describe the mobile application that we 
used for our case-study. Then we detail the social login and 
reputation computation aspects of this application. 
3.1 MUSES Mobile Application 
Corporate users increasingly use computing environments in 
many other places than the corporate offices, accessing corporate 
information from homes, airports, conferences, etc. They often 
also use their own devices as part of the Bring Your Own Device 
(BYOD) trend. In addition, there are more and more projects 
where different companies and contractors have to collaboratively 
work together. Thus, the trustworthiness in both employees and 
external collaborators, who have no direct employment contract 
with the company of the Chief Security Officer (CSO), has to be 
taken into account in a more dynamic way. The computing 
environments are not fully controlled by the CSOs and new 
metrics to dynamically assess the trustworthiness of computing 
environments are needed.  
The mobile application used for our case-study is the mobile 
client of an EU-funded FP7 project called MUSES [16]. The 
overall purpose of MUSES is to foster corporate security by 
reducing the risks introduced by user behavior, especially when 
they want to access corporate data when they are outside of the 
company and/or with their personal device in a BYOD way. Once 
the MUSES mobile application is installed on the user device, a 
computational trust engine that is running in the mobile 
application, monitors what the user is doing, as well as its security 
state. Based on the analysis of this context information, MUSES 
enforces appropriate security policies. 
One of MUSES’ strengths is its user and device neutrality. This 
means that the system will be useable by everybody who is 
dealing with company data assets, regardless whether he is an 
independent contractor or employed by the company, and 
regardless the ownership of the device being used to request 
company information. In MUSES, the following cases occur: 
1. An employee uses a company-owned mobile device;
2. A contractor uses a company-owned mobile device;
3. An employee uses a personal mobile device;
4. A contractor uses a personal mobile device.
3.2 Social Login 
The first time the user installs the MUSES mobile application on 
a new mobile device, as depicted in Figure 1, the user must agree 
with the installation policy, which must take into account the legal 
requirements of the country where it is installed, for example, in 
Belgium the ones we present in Section 4.   
Figure 1. MUSES installation and social login user interfaces 
After installing our MUSES mobile application, as depicted in 
Figure 1, the user has the choice to create an account and log in 
either with a MUSES login/password or social login through a 
number of social networks. 
3.3 Reputation Computation 
When a user requests to access sensitive company data assets, the 
MUSES application will check the trustworthiness of the user. 
One way by which the application foresees to update the user’s 
online reputation is through the use of social login features.  
If the user chooses to login via a social network, the MUSES 
mobile application, depending on the social network, may also be 
able to retrieve other information about the user and use it to 
compute the reputation of the user in MUSES context. For 
example, as depicted in Figure 2, if the user chooses to log in via 
LinkedIn, the user’s skills endorsed in LinkedIn and education 
degrees and diploma are used to compute a reputation score from 
1 to 10 regarding security technology awareness. A user with a 
Master in Computer Science will get a higher score than a user 
without education related to computer science. The details of the 
reputation computation are beyond the scope of the paper that 
focuses in the following section on what kind of further 
computation can be done from a legal point of views, after which 
user consents, how long, and depending on the user type, 
employee or contractor. 
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Figure 2. MUSES reputation computation user interface 
4. THE USE OF SOCIAL LOGIN
FEATURES IN THE WORKPLACE 
ACCORDING TO BELGIAN LAW 
By using social login features, applications gain access to user 
information stored on the user’s social networks. What happens 
here is that the application will scan a user’s profile in order to 
compute his current level of trustworthiness, and accordingly 
grant or deny him access to the requested company information. 
The use of such social login features thus provokes a discussion 
on privacy and data protection rights. Since the studied 
application is a company-controlled application, this discussion 
should be held accordingly taking into account the particularities 
of workplace environments.  
In what follows, the legal requirements for the use of social login 
features are examined when using personal data of workers. The 
first subsection provides an overview of the applicable law. The 
second subsection summarizes the general European principles of 
privacy and data protection in the workplace in the context of our 
MUSES application. Where relevant, these general principles are 
further specified according to Belgian law. The choice for a 
Belgian approach follows from the interesting specifications with 
regard to employee data protection foreseen by the Belgian 
legislators.  
4.1 Applicable Law 
The processing of personal data is regulated in Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data [17]. The Data Protection Directive protects data subjects 
whose personal data are processed. According to Article 2, a) of 
the Directive, personal data is “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’)”. The 
information retrieved from the user’s social network by the here 
studied application is thus considered as personal data. The 
concept of processing is defined as “any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or 
not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, 
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, 
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, 
erasure or destruction” (Art. 2, b Data Protection Directive). This 
is a widely formulated definition including basically all operations 
one could possibly perform upon personal data. To gain access to 
someone’s social network in order to analyze the there-found 
information, is thus considered as processing of personal data. 
Since the Data Protection Directive has a very general character, 
also employees are protected by this Directive. 
As it is necessary for directives to get enforced, the Data 
Protection Directive was implemented in the national Belgian 
law1. With regard to the general aspects of data protection, the 
Belgian law by the Law of 8 December 1992 on the privacy 
protection in relation to the processing of personal data was 
modified [18]. In particular with regard to the protection of 
employees in their employment context, the general (European) 
data protection principles are specified in the Belgian Collective 
Bargaining Agreement No. 81 (CBA No. 81) of 26 April 2002 on 
the privacy protection of employees regarding the surveillance of 
their electronic online communication [19]. The applicability of 
this lex specialis is limited to the processing of personal data 
which concerns employees. The processing of personal data of 
contractors, not employed by the company, falls outside the scope 
of CBA No. 81. Such processing operations must be reviewed in 
the light of the general data protection rules (Belgian Privacy 
Law).  
4.2 Workplace Data Protection Principles and 
Case-Study Law-derived Requirements 
The Data Protection Directive provides data subjects with legal 
guarantees in case their personal data are processed2. As a general 
rule, the Directive only allows data processing when the data are 
“processed fairly and lawfully” (Art. 6, 1, a) DP Directive). In the 
next paragraphs more requirements are discussed. 
4.2.1 Controller and Processor of Personal Data 
Before any processing activity is carried out, it should be clear 
who is charged with the role of the controller. The controller is 
the natural or legal person who is responsible for the processing 
of the personal data (Art. 2, d) DP Directive; Art. 1, §4 Law). He 
defines the means and purposes of the data processing activity and 
he shall notify the national data protection authority before the 
data are processed (Art. 18, 1) DP Directive; Art. 17, §1 Law). In 
the mobile application in our studied case, it is most likely the 
1  The Belgian Law was already adopted in 1992, but when the Directive 
was adopted, it was implemented in the existing Law. They chose not to 
adopt a new Law, but alter the existing one to be compatible with the 
Directive. 
2 On 25 January 2012 the European Commission proposed a 
comprehensive reform of the data protection legislation in the European 
Union. Due to the limited extent of this paper and the many 
uncertainties on the substance of the proposed changes, especially with 
regard to the employment context, the proposed changes are left out of 
the discussion in this paper. 
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company to whose networks the user aims to gain access to, who 
acts as controller since he provides the MUSES mobile 
application configured for its company information system and 
network. However, it is possible that the company delegates the 
actual act of the processing of the personal data to another entity 
(the processor), who will in that case process the data on behalf 
of the controller (Art. 2, e) DP Directive; Art. 1, §5 Law). 
4.2.2 Legal Grounds for the Processing of Personal 
Data 
The controller must ensure that at least one of the criteria for 
making the processing legitimate is met (Art. 7 DP Directive; Art. 
5 Law). These criteria are called legal grounds and include 
situations where the data subject has given his unambiguous 
consent; the processing is necessary for compliance with an 
obligation to which the controller is subject; the processing is 
necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; 
the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried 
out in the public interest; or when the processing is necessary for 
the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller 
or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed. It 
might thus happen that personal data are processed without the 
data subject’s consent, though the interpretation of the provision 
is very restrictive. It is required that a national law specifically 
foresees in an obligation to process the personal data, e.g. for 
social security or tax purposes. With regard to the processing of 
special categories of data, such as sensitive data, the legal grounds 
are even more restrictive (Art. 8 DP Directive; Art. 6-7 Law). As 
sensitive data should be considered: “personal data revealing 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the 
processing of data concerning health or sex life” (Art. 8, 1) DP 
Directive). Although not the only legal ground for processing, the 
consent of the data subject remains the most likely ground for 
processing [20].  
Currently consent is the most common legal ground. To make this 
consent legitimate, privacy policies, accessible at the time of 
installation of the mobile application, are of cardinal importance. 
When the user agrees with the privacy policy, he gives his consent 
for the processing of the personal data. In the studied case this 
action is materialized by a ticking-box. Although this is a very 
easy accessible way of asking consent, the value of online consent 
through ticking-boxes has been challenged [21]. Crucial is that 
the individual must fully understand that by the action of ticking 
the box, he is giving his consent. Therefore, it is recommended to 
not pre-tick the consent box. The Data Protection Directive 
requires that the consent of the data subject has to be given freely, 
informed and for a specific purpose (Art. 2, h) DP Directive). 
‘Freely’ means that the consent must be given without external 
influence and with the possibility to withdraw. ‘Informed’ means 
that the data subject must be aware of the means and purposes of 
the processing before he grants his consent. ‘Specific’ means that 
the consent can only be given for a specific operation, any new 
processing operation requires a new consent [11]. The purpose (to 
check trustworthiness and reputation of the user), and the extent 
of the data processed (which data), must be included in the policy. 
Besides the users should also be informed that their personal data 
will be used to compute further reputation and about all their 
rights and the procedures guaranteeing this rights. Specifically, 
the users must be informed about which personal data will be 
processed, how long they will be stored and who will have access 
to it. At least it must be clear from the policy who the controller is 
of the personal data, and if any, who the processor is, the 
procedures for the rights of the data subject. The importance of 
the notion of consent becomes is also visual in Article 7 of the 
proposed Data Protection Regulation, that is entirely dedicated to 
the notion of consent.   
Another interesting difficulty with regard to the data subject’s 
consent as a legal ground for the processing of personal data 
follows from the fact that users can only agree with the processing 
of their own personal data, and cannot agree with the use of their 
friends’ personal data [14]. In our mobile application case where 
recommendations are made by friends or contacts, it means that 
the personally identifiable information about the friends or 
contacts of the retrieved recommendations cannot be processed if 
the friends or contacts have not given their consent. The 
recommendations can be used for reputation computation but 
without storing personally identifiable information of friends or 
contacts if they have not given their consent. 
With regard to the use of the personal data of employees, some 
additional considerations should be made. The MUSES mobile 
application, which allows users to access company sensitive data, 
would be frequently used by employees. These employees may 
use their personally owned or corporate mobile devices to access 
the corporate networks. However, the subordinate relationship 
which characterizes the relationship with their employers, draw a 
particular attention to their situation. In the legal analysis of the 
social login feature, and on the assumption that the application 
and the system is legitimate, the ownership of the device is not 
determinant. In case the employee uses a device owned by the 
company, the application is most likely standard on the device. 
Still, there should be a legal ground for the processing. As 
discussed here above, the most likely legal ground is consent. In 
both cases, personally and company owned, the user should give 
his free consent. The Article 29 Working Party “takes the view 
that where as a necessary and unavoidable consequence of the 
employment relationship an employer has to process personal 
data it is misleading if it seeks to legitimise this processing 
through consent” [22]. Reliance on consent should therefore be 
“confined to cases where the worker has a genuine free choice 
and is subsequently able to withdraw the consent without 
detriment” [22]. This is the case when workers are offered 
reasonable alternatives and when they are not subjected to any 
direct or indirect pressure to use the social login for the MUSES 
application. In the studied case the social login is not the only way 
to gain access to the MUSES application. As an alternative the 
user could complete a traditional form to gain access to the 
application. It should be pointed out that consent is not the only 
legal ground, and that the processing can be found on other legal 
grounds. In Belgium a legal ground for the processing of personal 
data retrieved from social network profiles of employees can be 
found in Article 5, §1, 3° CBA No. 81, allowing the processing of 
personal data of employees for purposes of security and the 
functioning of the IT-networks of the company. In this case all 
formal procedures set out in the CBA are to be respected. 
However, the CBA is formulated in a very general and very 
abstract way.  
The Proposed Regulation significantly restricts the use of consent 
for legitimizing data processing. For MUSES particularly 
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interesting is the introduction of Article 7 (4) of the Proposed 
Regulation. Under this provision, the use of consent is not 
allowed as a legal basis for the processing, “where there is a 
significant imbalance between the position of the data subject and 
the controller”. Recital 34 clarifies that such an imbalance 
includes especially the case where the data subject is in a situation 
of dependence from the controller. As situation of dependence 
should be considered, amongst others, the situation where 
personal data are processed by the employer of employees’ 
personal data in the employment context. 
The use of consent as a legal basis for the processing of employee 
data will thus be even more difficult. Though, the Data Protection 
Regulation Proposal also brings solutions. Also under the current 
Directive it is difficult to find a clear legal basis for the processing 
of employee data for network and IT security purposes. To tackle 
this difficulty, Recital 39, explicitly clarifies that “the processing 
of data to the extent strictly necessary for the purposes of 
ensuring network and information security [...] constitutes a 
legitimate interest of the concerned data controller”. 
4.2.3 Data Protection Principles 
Moreover the controller must ensure that the processing 
operations comply with all data protection principles (Art. 6 DP 
Directive; Art. 4 Law). The first principle is concerned with 
purpose limitation. Article 6, 1, b of the Data Protection 
Directive states that personal data may only be collected for 
“specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes”. It is 
required to precisely define the reason why the personal data is 
processed.   
In line with the first principle the principle of data minimization 
and data accuracy states that personal data might only be 
processed when this is necessary to achieve the described 
purposes. To this end Article 6, 1, c-d requires that the data are 
“adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes 
for which they are collected and/or further processed” (data 
minimization), and that the data are “accurate and, where 
necessary, kept up to date” (data accuracy). This means that the 
controller can only process personal data when this is necessary to 
achieve the goals of the processing. Thus, once the goals of the 
processing are clear, the controller must precise which 
information (such as the name of the user) is necessary to achieve 
thesegoals. With regard to the discussed case, it should be 
considered whether all social network profiles are relevant for the 
application (data relevance). Moreover it should be considered 
whether some profiles should be excluded from the list of profiles 
potentially used for the reputation update. Questions that should 
be asked are: is the information necessary and is there no less-
intrusive way? It is possible that Facebook profiles are presumed 
to be part of the private life more than of the professional life. A 
potential social network profile to check online reputation for 
professional purposes is LinkedIn, since a professional character 
is deemed to be inherent to the social network. 
The third data protection principle concerns the data retention. 
This principle limits the controllers in the storage of the processed 
personal data. It states that personal data can only be kept in a 
“form which permits identification of the data subjects for no 
longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were 
collected or for which they are further processed” (Art. 6, 1, e DP 
Directive). Again it has to be clear for which purposes the data 
will be used and how long they will be stored according to that 
purpose. Storing data for a longer period than necessary is only 
possible in anonymized form. For the reasons of prevention, 
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, the 
recent Belgian implementation of Directive 2006/24/EC3, 
introduced a new obligation for network operators. From now on, 
location and traffic data of users should be kept for a period of 
twelve months, though this period will be further specified by a 
Royal Decree. The CBA does not provide for specific retention 
periods and only discusses the principles. In our mobile 
application case study applied in Belgium, there is no requirement 
to store location and traffic data for the reasons of prevention, 
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. 
Although no sensitive data (Art. 8 DP Directive; Art. 6-7 Law) is 
required by our studied mobile application, the processing thereof 
is likely to depend on the API agreements with the social 
networks mentioned. These API agreements must be analyzed and 
transparently described to the users. Retrieved data must be 
encrypted when possible. The data must be stored in the EU and 
not transferred to third countries. With regard to non-anonymized 
data, a distinction is made between the unprocessed retrieved 
personal data from the social networks, on the one hand, and the 
personal data relating to the results of the computed online 
reputation, on the other hand. In the studied case of social login 
one could argue that the retrieved personal data might only be 
kept until access to the application (and consequently the 
company network) is granted, since the purpose of the processing 
of the social network data is limited to the social reputation 
update, and maximum maximorum to the access of the company 
network, which is the ultimate goal of the social login. However, 
this does not necessarily exclude the possibility to keep the data 
for a longer period of time, even in a non-anonymized form. The 
controller may keep the data when the storage of these data is 
based on another legal ground serving another purpose, which 
might follow from the purpose of the processing of personal data 
by the application or even the MUSES system in general (not 
likely for this type of data). With regard to the ‘by-the-MUSES-
system-processed’ retrieved data, it can be argued that they could 
be stored for a longer time period. If the purpose of the processing 
is the update of the online reputation and this information stays 
relevant for the application until the next update, say the next 
login, storage could be necessary for this time period. Even when 
this, between two logins, is a very long time, it could be argued 
that such a storage of data is necessary for the purposes of the 
processing. Nevertheless, if the user does not want the system to 
keep the data for a longer period, and the data are no longer 
adequate or accurate, he could ask for the erasure of the personal 
3  Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in 
connection with the provision of publicly available electronic 
communication services or of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:006
3:EN:PDF; implemented by the Belgian Law of 30 July 2013 
concerning the modification of Articles 2, 126 and 145 of the Law of 13 
June 2005 on the Electronic Communication, and Article 90decies of 
the Criminal Procedure Code, Belgisch Staatsblad 23 August 2013, 
http://www.t-regs.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Moniteur-belge-23-
aug-2013.pdf.  
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data (Art. 12, b) DP Directive). According to the new Belgian 
Electronic Communications Law, as modified by the Law of 30 
July 2013, it is required that traffic and location data are kept for 
12 months for purposes of criminal investigations (Art. 126, §3, 2 
Electronic Communications Law). Other data should still be kept 
for no longer period than necessary according to the Privacy Law 
and the CBA. 
Finally, all processing operations on personal data must be done 
“fairly and lawfully”. Even when the legal ground for processing 
is defined, and all other data protection principles are respected, 
Article 6, 1, a of the Data Protection Directive foresees in a kind 
of ultimate catch-all protection mechanism that requires that 
personal data “must be processed in a way that does not bring 
about a breach of either data protection law or other legal 
requirements” [22], and moreover that the data are processed 
fairly, with respect to all interests at stake. Interesting here is the 
discussion on the reasonable expectations of workers and the 
proportionality principle. 
4.2.4 Rights of the Data Subject 
In addition, the controller should also be aware of (and respect) 
the rights of the data subject.  
A first right that is foreseen by the Directive and the Law is the 
right of information (Art. 10-11 DP Directive; Art. 9 Law). This 
right shows that privacy policies are not exclusively relevant to 
acquire an informed consent, but also in order to comply with the 
principle of transparency and information. There must be clarity 
and transparency about the data that will be retrieved, and about 
the consequences of the data received by third parties. In most 
cases this is (pre-)determined by the API agreements with the 
concerned social networks. Yet, it is the role of the MUSES 
service provider to communicate the specifics of the context to its 
users.  
The second right data subject right is the right of access, which 
also covers the right to rectification, erasure and/or blocking of 
data which processing does not comply with the Directive (Art. 12 
DP Directive; Art. 10 Law). The third right of the data subject is 
the right to object to the processing of data relating to him/her 
(Art. 14 DP Directive; Art. 12 Law). Though this third right 
specifically aims to protect the data subjects against the re-use of 
their personal data for direct marketing purposes, which is not the 
case here discussed.  
Moreover, data subjects have the right to judicial remedy in case 
of breach (Art. 22 DP Directive; Art. 14-15 Law).  
And finally, Article 15 of the Directive grants the data subjects 
with a right of protection against automated individual 
decisions (Art. 12bis Law). An automated individual decision is a 
decision that significantly affects a person and which is based 
solely on automated processing of personal data in order to 
evaluate him as a person. Since such an evaluation may relate to 
different personal aspects, such as performance at work, 
creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc., the decisions made by 
the MUSES system should be considered as automated individual 
decisions. Automated individual decisions are in principle 
prohibited, although, this prohibition does not apply when the 
decision is taken in the context of an agreement, which also lays 
down measures to safeguard the data subject’s legitimate interests 
(such as objection to wrongful decisions). Yet again, the 
information and transparency towards the data subject are an 
essential condition for legitimate processing of personal data.  
4.2.5 Security Obligations 
Another data protection safeguard laid down in the Directive 
relates to the security of the processing and the personal data 
processed (security principle). The controller must implement 
“appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect 
personal data against any accidental or unlawful destruction or 
accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access” 
(Article 17, 1 DP Directive; Art. 16 Law). In practice this means 
that ‘state of the art’ measures are implemented depending on the 
character of the processed personal data. For example, encryption 
of personal data might help to prevent data breaches in case 
unauthorized parties gain access to databases and the there stored 
data.  
4.2.6 Transfer of Personal Data 
Personal data may only be transferred to third countries under 
certain conditions. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Data Protection 
Directive, personal data may be transferred only to third countries 
which  guarantee an adequate level of data protection (Art. 25, 1) 
DP Directive; Art. 21 Law). In assessing the level of adequacy 
particular consideration shall be given to “the nature of the data, 
the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or 
operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, 
the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third 
country in question and the professional rules and security 
measures which are complied with in that country” (Art. 25, 2) 
DP Directive) [23]. If the recipient country is not considered to 
ensure an adequate level of protection, the transfer may be still 
possible and allowed according to Article 26 of the Data 
Protection Directive. This could be the case when the data 
controller offers the adequate safeguards themselves through e.g. 
appropriate contractual clauses; or under the derogations provided 
by the first paragraph of Article 26, e.g. unambiguous consent of 
the data subject [24]. 
5. CONCLUSION
This paper studied the requirements for the use of social login 
features used by companies to verify the trustworthiness of 
workers trying to access their company networks. 
In Belgium, the personal data being processed by the discussed 
mobile application are protected by the Belgium Privacy Law, 
which implemented the general EU Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC. For the protection of the personal data of Belgian 
employees, the Belgian Collective Bargaining Agreement No. 81 
is applicable. Contractors are excluded from the scope of this 
CBA No. 81. The protection of their personal data falls under the 
general protection of the Belgian Privacy Law.  
Informed consent could be the most relevant legal basis to make a 
processing legitimate. Before the users may give their consent, 
they should be informed on the specific purpose for which their 
personal data are processed, which data will be processed (and 
why these data), who will have access to the data, and how long 
the data will be stored. Regarding the processed data, it was 
considered that in the professional context of MUSES, LinkedIn 
is a more appropriate social network to retrieve user information 
from than Facebook because of the inherent professional purpose 
of LinkedIn user profiles. With regard to the retention of the data, 
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a distinction is made between the information retrieved from the 
social network profiles as such, and the personal data resulting 
from the reputation computation by MUSES. The storage of the 
reputation data is necessary for the purposes of the processing 
because this information stays relevant for the application until 
the next update, say the next login, even in a long time. 
Nevertheless, the user could ask for the erasure of the personal 
data. 
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